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 On October 9, 2016, several hundred armed residents of Rakhine, a western state of the 
Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Myanmar), ambushed three Border Guard Police posts, 
leading to the death of nine police officers (Kim, 2017, p. 106). These attacks triggered a 
massive military backlash against Rohingya residents, a minority ethnic group of Myanmar, who 
were believed to have organized the attack. These “area clearance operations” have only 
worsened since August 25, 2017, when insurgents in a newly formed Arakan Rohingya Salvation 
Army (ARSA) attacked dozens of police posts and military bases, killing 12 members of 
Myanmar’s security forces (Freeman, 2017). Fortify Rights, a Swedish-United States human 
rights group with a focus in Southeast Asia, reported the first case of massive exterminations 
against the Rohingya in Chut Pyin, a Rakhine village where more than 200 people were 
murdered this past August (Ramzy, 2017b).  
This current 2016-2018 Rohingya-refugee and ethnic cleansing crisis has been defined by 
the military’s extreme levels of violence inflicted upon Rohingya, as well as unprecedented 
levels of migration from the Rakhine state. The majority of Myanmar Rohingya have sought 
refuge in nearby Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, which borders Rakhine. According to latest estimates 
by the International Organization for Migration, the migration agency of the United Nations, 
more than 655,500 Rohingya have fled into Bangladesh since August 25, 2017, which excludes 
the number of Rohingya who exited the country prior to this date (2018).  
Given the immediate attention required to respond to humanitarian crises effectively, this 
paper will examine the historical sociological causes of and political barriers to resolution of the 
2016-2018 Rohingya-refugee and ethnic cleansing crisis to determine what measures are 
contextually appropriate to address the needs of the Rohingya people moving forward. Through a 
qualitative research analysis, this paper ultimately concludes that given the historical and 
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political context underlying the 2016-2018 Rohingya-refugee and ethnic cleansing crisis, 
repatriation efforts, while politically expedient, are only temporary solutions that do not address 
the Rohingya’s people’s history of abuse in Myanmar and their cultural claim to territory in 
Rakhine. Further, future relief efforts should seek local, aid-based solutions in Bangladesh and 
prioritize humanitarian concerns based on the political limitations to action.  
“The Next Great Genocide”2: Context and Importance of the Rohingya Crisis 
While recent Rohingya militant aggression may have instigated the military’s most 
intense ethnic cleansing policies against the minority group, the Rohingya people have a long 
history of being displaced and attacked in Southeast Asia, especially in Myanmar. Assessing the 
nature of the Rohingya’s historical persecution in Myanmar can offer insight into the cause for 
ethnic cleansing policies today.  
The Rohingya people trace their roots in Myanmar back to the 10th century (Iqbal, 2016, 
p. 18), at which point Muslim descendants of 8th century Arab, Persian, Turk, Mughal, and 
Bengali traders, religious figures, and warriors developed their own culture and language, with 
local Arakanese (Rakhine-based) influences (Kim, 2017, p. 107). In this way, the Rohingya 
people claim a centuries-old ethnic identity that emerged before British colonial rule from 1824 
to 1948. However, ethnic Burmese and “official” records in Myanmar refute this claim and argue 
that the Rohingya people are Bengali ethnically, and that they first emigrated to Rakhine during 
the British colonial period (Iqbal, 2016, p. 18; Kim, 2017, p. 107). Through this disputed 
territorial claim, the Myanmar military has justified its right to perpetrate violence against the 
Rohingya, viewing them as illegal immigrants or terrorists. Indeed, the Myanmar government 
                                                     
2 Terminology based on H. Iqbal’s (2017) analysis of the 2016-2018 Rohingya refugee and ethnic cleansing crisis. 
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refers to the ethnic cleansing as a “clearance” operation in response to a Rohingya insurgency 
(Haque, 2017).  
 The scale of violence for Rohingya during this crisis includes not only the structural 
violence faced within Rakhine, but also the danger in crossing over to Bangladesh and the 
struggle engendered by an inadequate livelihood in refugee camps. According to a flash report 
conducted by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UNHCHR), Rohingya communities have faced protracted displacement, as well as restrictions 
on freedom of movement and access to education (2017, p. 5). In the northern part of Rakhine 
(nRS), Rohingya must acquire official authorization to move between and within townships 
(UNHCHR, 2017, p. 6). Since June 2012, a curfew has been imposed in nRS, and it was 
extended following the October 9, 2016 attacks. Due to this limitation on movement, the 
Rohingya refugees have found it easier to flee to Bangladesh, rather than to other parts of 
Rakhine or into another region of Myanmar. Among those Rohingya interviewed for the flash 
report, 65% reported killings, 56% reported disappearances, 64% reported beatings, 43% 
reported rape, 64% reported burning or other destruction of property, and 40% reported 
looting/theft of property (UNHCHR, 2017, p. 7). The flash report refers to cases of plastic 
burning onto the body, burning of religiously grown beards, psychological torture, stress position 
torture, arbitrary detention, denial of food/medical care, and common house searches 
(UNHCHR, 2017, pp. 25-34). Similar testimonies from victims throughout Bangladeshi refugee 
camps indicate the systematic and widespread nature of the army’s attacks against Rohingya 
civilians (UNHCHR, 2017, p. 14).  
The scale and coordinated nature of these claims have only been further substantiated by 
interviews and practices conducted since the August 25, 2017 incident. From August 25, 2017 to 
CRISIS IN MYANMAR AND BANGLADESH: JORDAN RICHMOND 5 
 
 
 
September 16, 2017, Human Rights Watch (2017a) documented the destruction of 214 Rohingya 
villages in Rakhine. According to satellite imagery, tens of thousands of Rohingya homes and 
mosques in the Maungdaw and Rathedaunt Townships were razed, while non-Rohingya homes 
just 100 yards away were untouched. Myanmar’s military alleges that ARSA militants and 
Rohingya villagers purposefully burned their own homes to incite violence within Rakhine, 
denying accountability for the destruction. The humanitarian organization Doctors Without 
Borders estimated that at least 6,700 Rohingya since August 25, 2017 have been systematically 
eliminated by the military (Taylor, 2018). Further, Myanmar’s government has continued to 
block the access of aid agencies to Rakhine, preventing assistance to those Rohingya still trapped 
(Ramzy, 2017a).   
 Refugees escaping Rakhine have faced injury and even death in the process of reaching 
Bangladeshi camps. At least 46 people believed to be Rohingya fleeing violence were found 
dead on the banks of the Naf River after their boat capsized on October 1, according to 
Bangladeshi border guard battalions (Ramzy, 2017b). In addition, Marzuki Darusman, 
Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, noted that 
Myanmar security forces are setting up land mines along the border of Rakhine to maim or kill 
those Rohingya trying to escape violence (Win, 2017). ARSA has tried to block men from 
fleeing villages in nRS too, demanding that they stay and fight against the government for the 
Rohingya people (Ramzy, 2017a).  
The danger for Rohingya who reach and stay in refugee camps has not been limited to 
Myanmar’s territory, either. Initially, those Rohingya fleeing Rakhine had to evade Bangladeshi 
border guards to reach refugee camps, where food and accommodations were not guaranteed 
(McKirdy and Wright, 2017). Existing refugee camps from previous Rakhine exoduses were 
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subject to further overcrowding, and Bangladeshi law enforcers threatened not to provide shelter 
to any newcomers, as well as to evict, to fine, and to deport those Rohingya already present in 
the camps. Bangladesh’s policy has since changed, as the Bangladeshi government has made 
efforts to register all Rohingya (Sullivan, 2017). On the road from the border to Cox’s Bazar, the 
main site of relocation, 11 checkpoints now exist for refugees, where photographs are taken, 
finger biometrics are conducted, and identification cards are issued.  
According to a 2017 situation report released by IOM, 833,584 Rohingya from previous 
and current crises live in Cox’s Bazar (Inter Sector Coordination Group, 2017). Nearly 500,000 
of those Rohingya refugees live in the Nayapara, Kutupalong, or Kutupalong-Balukhali 
Expansion mega camps. Nearby, six spontaneous settlements and four local Bangladeshi 
communities host the remaining Rohingya. However, while Bangladeshi communities and 
security forces along the border have extended aid to the Rohingya refugees in earnest (McKirdy 
and Wright, 2017), Bangladesh’s refusal to recognize the Rohingya as official refugees has 
limited their access to education and freedom of movement (Sullivan, 2017).  
Reports from officials in Bangladesh are estimating thousands of deaths due to health 
complications without quick intervention arising from this crisis (Freeman, 2017). Amid fears of 
a massive cholera outbreak due to poor sanitation conditions within the refugee camps, the U.N. 
launched one of its largest cholera vaccination drives in southeast Bangladesh on October 10 
(Marchand and Thibaut, 2017). However, the increased rate of arrivals to the refugee camps 
since October 9, when 11,000 refugees arrived overnight, has impeded this effort. Additionally, 
after establishing pop-up clinics within several Bangladeshi refugee camps and screening 
thousands of patients, the U.N. International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has expressed fears that 
14,000 Rohingya children may die from malnutrition due to complications resulting from the 
CRISIS IN MYANMAR AND BANGLADESH: JORDAN RICHMOND 7 
 
 
 
ethnic cleansing, and that more than 4,000 children are suspected to have contracted diphtheria 
(Bellis, 2017; UN News Centre, 2018). The World Health Organization worries that the high 
concentration of people in Bangladesh’s mega camps, which are now the largest in the world, 
may facilitate the catastrophic transmission of these diseases among Rohingya refugees 
(Beaubien, 2018; Sullivan, 2017).  
Due to the large scale of violence and the insufficient response by the international 
community to this crisis, the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya in Myanmar warrants utmost attention 
and understanding from neighboring states, regional powers like India and China, and the 
international community as a whole. In many ways, the horrors that the Rohingya are facing as a 
religious and ethnic community resemble the situation for Bosnian Muslims during the 
Yugoslavia civil wars and Jewish populations under Nazi occupation. In both situations, legal 
and socioeconomic conditions functionally displaced Bosnian Muslim and Jewish populations 
within their own states, and assisted in the targeted genocide of their communities. The 
UNHCHR’s February 3 flash report, the final report of the independent Advisory Commission 
on Rakhine State, and the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar all attest 
to the effective annihilation of Rohingya people in nRs.  
Sociocultural and Historical Sources of the Crisis 
The severity of this crisis necessitates an investigation into its foundations and sources of 
exacerbation. This investigation starts with the territory of conflict: the Rakhine state. Arakan 
(present-day Rakhine) was an independent kingdom invaded by Burma in 1784. Under 40 years 
of Burmese rule, native Arakanese, including Rohingya, fled the country to avoid its oppressive 
government (Kim, 2017, p. 111). After Arakan was annexed to British India in 1826, immense 
numbers of immigrants traveled from Bengal to Arakan, seeking economic opportunities and 
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land in an area that was considered internal to British India. When returning to Arakan under 
British rule, the Rohingya could not prove their original land claims to colonial officials, as they 
lacked physical documentation of settlement and were deprived the right to rule over their former 
homeland. In this way, periods of political unrest in Ararkan contributed to the Rohingya’s 
unsubstantial claim to settle in and rule over Rakhine.  
Hyuk Kim, contributor to the academic journal Global Asia, argues that different 
understandings of “Rohingya” and insufficient historical records with a clear reference to the 
term “Rohingya” have allowed the state to justify its discriminatory practices against the 
Rohingya people into the modern era. The Citizenship Law of 1982, which restricts citizenship 
to those inhabitants who can prove that their ancestors lived in the country before the first Anglo-
Burmese war in 1824, which established British colonial governance over Arakan (Iqbal, 2016, 
p. 19), has become the centerpiece for these practices. This law distinguishes among three 
categories of citizenship by issuing each person a color-coded Citizenship Scrutiny Card 
consistent with their citizenship status – pink, blue, and green, respectively (Human Rights 
Watch, 2000b). Because the majority of Rohingya in Rakhine re-emigrated to Arakan during the 
British colonial period (i.e. post-1824), the community cannot provide “conclusive evidence” of 
their lineage and prove their eligibility for any class of citizenship. Additionally, Myanmar’s 
current constitution, ratified in 2008, does not recognize the Rohingya as one of the country’s 
national races (Human Rights Watch, 2017a), which would entitle them legally to participation 
in government, self-determination, and the development of their own language and culture 
(Ministry of Information, 2008, pp. 5, 7).  
Kim also argues that the historical dispute over the Rohingya’s place of origin and ethnic 
identity stimulated the tension between Rohingya and Buddhists/Burmese in Myanmar, which 
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has continued into the late 20th and 21st centuries. Mary Kate Long, contributor to the Asian 
Journal of Public Affairs, notes the beginning of this tension in 1823, when large influxes of 
Bengali and Indian migrants settled in Burma as a result of the British East India Company’s 
victory in the first Anglo-Burmese war (2013, p. 82). These migrants forced out many local 
Burmese from their jobs, as they were prepared to accept lower wages. Based on research 
conducted by Moshe Yegar in 1972, Long argues that 1920s marriage laws and “broad-reaching 
socioeconomic distress” resulting from the worldwide economic depression contributed to anti-
Muslim sentiment in Burma (2013, p. 82). Buddhists blamed the migrant groups for their 
economic woes, and mischaracterized the Rohingya as Indian and Bengali in origin, rather than 
as Arakan nationals returning to their homeland during the colonial immigration wave. After the 
British withdrew from Burma in 1942, communal violence between Rakhine Buddhists and 
Rohingya erupted amid the anarchy. Local Rakhine people viewed the Rohingya as an 
“immediate threat to the unity and preservation of their culture and language,” fearing that 
Rohingya Muslims would impose Sharia Law (Kim, 2017, p. 111).  
These distorted images of the Rohingya and other Muslim groups in Myanmar have 
continued through the late 20th and 21st centuries, with social media instigating current public 
outrage at the Rohingya community. Facebook is the ultimate source of information for most 
people in Myanmar, and the exceptional ability of misinformation to spread across the social 
platform has exacerbated the public image of the Rohingya people (Mozur and Specia, 2017). 
Ultranationalist Buddhists like Ashin Wirathu post updates about the Rohingya being 
“aggressive outsiders” on their Facebook pages, and civilians and government/military officials 
alike accept their information as true. Faked videos of Muslims attacking and killing Buddhists 
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are shared every day among Myanmar’s 30 million Facebook users, igniting hatred in Burma 
against Muslim groups like the Rohingya.  
The military has sought to defend Buddhists’ right to hate Rohingya, as well, and the 
military junta government’s legacy of rule has contributed to violence against the Rohingya 
historically and presently. Following British rule, military leaders appealed to the collective 
Buddhist community to reinforce a national Burmese identity, putting other ethnic groups’ 
considerations to the wayside. After a formal military junta was established in 1962, the 
government banned the teaching of languages other than Burmese in order to protect the local 
Rakhine identity and the greater Burmese-Buddhist identity (Kim, 2017, p. 108). In cases where 
Rohingya militants targeted or were accused of targeting functional units of the state, like 
security forces or local Burmese/Buddhists in Rakhine, the Myanmar state directly participated 
or deliberately disregarded its duty to protect Rohingya from Buddhist extremist attacks (Iqbal, 
2016, p. 19). In 1978, the government targeted hundreds of “illegal immigrant” Muslims for 
slaughter under its Operation King Dragon, following the insurrection of Mujahid armed groups 
within the Rohingya community (Human Rights Watch, 2000a; Kim, 2017, p. 109). Throughout 
the 1990s, the military junta dismissed Rohingya political parties, denied the Rohingya any form 
of citizenship, forced Rohingya into labor camps, and arbitrarily confiscated Rohingya property 
(Human Rights Watch, 2000b; Kim 2017, p. 109). During recent years, military language 
referring to and actions taken against the Rohingya people have demonstrated the military’s 
protection of a Buddhist-Burmese identity. After three Rohingya were accused of raping and 
murdering a Buddhist woman in 2016, the military executed ten uninvolved Rohingya men in 
retaliation (Ramzy, 2017b). The military has regularly called Rohingya “foreign Bengalis,” and 
has referred to their Rohingya victims as “terrorists” or “terrorist sympathizers” whether or not 
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they were involved with ARSA (Al Jazeera and News Agencies, 2018). Even when 
acknowledging that the military killed the 10 Rohingya found in an Inn Din mass grave last year, 
Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing referred to the victims as “10 Bengali terrorists” who had 
threatened and provoked “ethnic Buddhist villagers” (Taylor, 2018) 
Additionally, these periods of military crackdown have largely determined the ebb and 
flow of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh. During surges of military crackdown on Rohingya in 
1978, 1991, and 2012, which are direct responses to Rohingya militants’ violence against the 
Burmese-Buddhist national identity (i.e. the state), the greatest levels of Rohingya sought refuge 
in Bangladesh (Human Rights Watch, 2000a; Kim, 2017, p. 108). 200,000 Rohingya between 
1977 and 1978, more than 250,000 Rohingya in 1991, and tens of thousands of Rohingya in 
2012 fled to Bangladesh (Al-Mahmood, 2016).  
Ultimately, this analysis of historical state policy and ethnic divisions in Myanmar assists 
in identifying the underlying sources of conflict to the 2016-2018 Rohingya refugee and ethnic 
cleansing crisis, as well as defines the parameters for future resolution to the crisis. Periods of 
political turnover in Arakan from 1784 to 1826, historical tensions between Rohingya Muslims 
and Buddhists in Rakhine, and the functional defense of the Buddhist-Burmese identity by the 
military junta government have contributed to the intense persecution of the Rohingya people 
today, and incorporating an understanding of the degree of this persecution into potential 
solutions, rather than adopting blanket solutions in response to the crisis, can create lasting 
change in Myanmar and Bangladesh for the Rohingya community. 
Political Limitations to Current Responses: Domestic and International Perspectives 
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 In addition to responding to the social causes of the ethnic cleansing and refugee crisis, 
future relief efforts must address the domestic and international political barriers to resolution of 
the conflict. These barriers specifically include the electoral and legal context of Daw Suu Kyi’s 
rise to power, Bangladesh’s duty to its local communities in Cox’s Bazar, China and India’s 
relationship with the Myanmar military, the organizational limitations of the United Nations, 
ASEAN’s functioning principles, as well as the legal consequence of state intervention in cases 
of ethnic cleansing and genocide.  
Myanmar 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularity is demonstrable: the Myanmar people affectionately 
refer to her as “Mother” or “the Lady” of Myanmar (Parker, 2017). However, the military’s 
continued independence and involvement in state policy has greatly overridden Daw Suu Kyi’s 
ability to lead. Myanmar’s current constitution allocates 25% of seats in Parliament to military 
and armed forces, and allows for military-backed parties like the Union Solidarity and 
Development Party (USDP) to run for remaining seats (Parker, 2017). Additionally, Daw Suu 
Kyi’s attempt to revise the constitution to assume greater authority resulted in the military’s 
assassination of her party’s legal adviser, U Ko Ni, at Yangon International Airport on January 
19, 2017 (Parker, 2017). Further, the military has retained autonomous control of the armed 
forces and ministries of defense, home affairs, and borders through Myanmar’s regime change. 
As such, Daw Suu Kyi, elected in 2015 to lead Myanmar as State Counsellor, has 
remained largely silent and inactive in reacting to the situation in Rakhine, only speaking twice 
on the crisis before repatriation agreement talks began. Despite international calls to condemn 
the violence, Daw Suu Kyi sidestepped allegations on September 19 concerning the violence in 
Rakhine, and cast doubt on claims by NGOs like Human Rights Watch that the military had 
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destroyed villages and murdered families (Freeman, 2017; Shapiro, 2017). She noted that the 
Myanmar government had no intention of apportioning blame or abnegating responsibility, 
condemning “all human rights violations and unlawful violence” (Freeman, 2017). Her office 
released a statement on Facebook shortly thereafter criticizing the “huge iceberg of 
misinformation” related to the Rohingya people’s treatment in Myanmar (Crawford, 2017). 
Further, Daw Suu Kyi has pushed for a bilateral solution to “the issues facing Myanmar and 
Bangladesh,” denouncing outside intervention (Cameron-Moore, 2017b). 
Supporters of Daw Suu Kyi argue that she is preserving her political capital in a primarily 
Buddhist country of 52 million that does not see Rohingya rights as a top priority, and in which 
many view the Rohingya as “foreign interlopers” (Crawford, 2017; Freeman, 2017). Although 
she was a political prisoner of the military junta government until her election in 2015, Daw Suu 
Kyi’s opportunity to install a sustainable democratic government in Myanmar outweighs her 
concern for the humanity and well-being of the Rohingya. 
These conditions help to explain the state’s response to the crisis. The delegation of 
Myanmar disassociated itself from Human Rights Council resolution 34/22, noting that a 
continuation of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar would not be a 
helpful course of action in solving the intricate Rakhine issue, and denied the potential for 
genocide in Rakhine (Bays, 2017; Win, 2017). In early September of 2017, Myanmar negotiated 
with China and Russia, both permanent veto-wielding of the U.N. Security Council, to block any 
investigations in the Rakhine state (Brunnstrom and Irish, 2017). Additionally, the term 
“Rohingya” is absent from Myanmar’s official statements, and Daw Suu Kyi has asked other 
foreign leaders to avoid use of the term (Holland and Mogato, 2017). Any confession to ethnic 
cleansing or genocide undermines Daw Suu Kyi’s popularity with military sympathizers and 
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anti-Rohingya Buddhists. Any action in coordination with Daw Suu Kyi against the military 
would have to be conducted diplomatically and through hushed communications.    
Bangladesh 
The current refugee wave has placed Bangladesh in a unique position either to help or to 
worsen the situation for the Rohingya. Facing international pressure, the country has established 
itself as a proponent of human rights, but local community needs are a primary concern as well.  
As such, Bangladesh’s government has considered local concerns above those of the 
Rohingya in various instances. Up until September 2017, the Bangladeshi government classified 
the Rohingya as Myanmar nationals who had “illegally infiltrated” the country and defended 
authoritative action against the collective Rohingya population (AFP, 2017). In January 2017, 
Bangladesh planned to relocate tens of thousands of Rohingya refugees to Thengar Char, a 
remote island in the Bay of Bengal, to keep them from “mixing with the locals” (AFP, 2017). 
Since 2014, the law has forbidden registrars from officiating at unions between Bangladeshi 
nationals and Rohingya refugees, and the High Court of Dhaka has upheld this ban into January 
2018 (BBC News, 2018).  
Every year, the Bangladeshi government bans fishing in the Naf River for a brief period 
to allow the local hilsa fish to breed (Tan, 2017b). During the refugee crisis, this policy’s success 
has come at the expense of the Rohingya, who have depended on local fishermen to rescue them 
from the other side of the river in Myanmar, where they are vulnerable to Myanmar military 
capture. Bangladesh, though facing criticism from the UNHCR to ensure safe passage for the 
Rohingya, saw the policy to its annual end on October 22, still putting its local needs first.  
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As mentioned previously, Bangladesh’s denial of official refugee status to the Rohingya 
has precluded them from accessing educational opportunities and the freedom to move within the 
country. Bangladeshi officials further have banned refugees from taking formal jobs, fearing that 
the Rohingya would flood the local labor market and drive down wages (Beaubien, 2018).  
Finally, even though Bangladesh has played gracious host to the Rohingya refugees, its 
government has been pursuing solutions that guarantee that the Rohingya will not be permanent 
residents (BBC 2017). While Bangladesh called for a repatriation process that is different from 
that of the 1990s agreement and that involves the U.N., the official 2017 repatriation agreement 
does not formally involve the U.N. and maintains stipulations similar to the 1990s agreement, 
which forced many Rohingya to return to Myanmar almost involuntarily (Cameron-Moore, 
2017b). A future limitation to Bangladesh’s support of the Rohingya community, then, is the 
country’s duty to support its own local communities first.  
Regional Powers: China and India 
China’s pull over Myanmar has become potent, even after the regime change. China is 
perhaps Myanmar’s greatest ally and economic supporter, selling everything from weapons to 
food grains in the neighboring state (Pant, 2017). When the European Union and the United 
States initiated various embargoes and sanctions in the early 1990s, Myanmar pivoted to China 
(Brunnstrom and Irish, 2017). Soon enough, China invested heavily in Myanmar’s mining and 
energy infrastructure, as well as became Myanmar’s foremost supplier of fighter aircraft, 
armored vehicles, guns, and naval ships (Asrar, 2017; Chazan, 2017). As waves of refugees have 
sought shelter through Myanmar’s history, and insurgency groups have challenged Myanmar’s 
government, China has assisted Bangladesh and Myanmar with border control along its 
“lawless” southwestern borderlands, further strengthening ties (Lee, 2017).  
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China’s support of Myanmar has been reflected in policies related to the refugee and 
ethnic cleansing crisis, as well. Following Daw Suu Kyi’s lead, the Chinese foreign ministry 
made no mention of “Rohingya” in its official statement after delivering 150 tons of aid, 
including 2,000 relief tents and 3,000 blankets, to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (Gao, 2017). 
During the U.N. Security Council’s first open meeting on the crisis, China’s Deputy U.N. 
Ambassador Wu Haitao asked the international community to “view the difficulties and 
challenges confronting the government of Myanmar, exercise patience, and provide support,” 
rather than substantiate claims that the military was engaged in an ethnic cleansing of the 
Rohingya people (Gao, 2017).  
As the other great regional leader in Asia, India has been forced to toe a line on the crisis, 
balancing its demands as the region’s (and the world’s) largest democracy and its strategic 
interests in Myanmar. Ultimately, India has prioritized its ability to challenge China politically 
and economically in Myanmar over its relations with Western democracies on this issue. 
Throughout the military junta’s rule over Myanmar, India ignored abuses against the Rohingya, 
rarely pushed for democracy, and built relations with military elites. This prioritization has 
continued through Daw Suu Kyi’s administration, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi has enacted 
projects like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Asian Trilateral Highway, the Kaladan multimodal 
project, a road-river-port cargo transport project, and the Bay of Bengal Initiative to Multi-
Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation to foster India-Myanmar economic relations 
(Pant, 2017). Official statements on the situation in Rakhine have only condemned ARSA’s 
actions, without recognition of the Rohingya’s plight. 
Further, anti-Muslim sentiment in India has limited the government’s motivation to assist 
the Rohingya. India maintains a large Rohingya refugee community as a byproduct of the 1998 
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military crackdown in Myanmar, and nearly 10,000 additional refugees have entered the country 
because of the current crisis (Pant, 2017). India has taken a hard line against the Rohingya, 
demanding their deportation, refusing to acknowledge the Myanmar military’s responsibility in 
the crisis, and remaining opposed to sanctions on the country. In the wake of India’s ultra-
nationalist security policies, 40,000 Rohingya that braved long and treacherous travel to India are 
facing deportation to Bangladesh (Gopalan, 2017). 
As U Ko Gyi, a prominent Myanmar democracy advocate who was jailed for 17 years by 
the military, acknowledged, as the West continues to criticize Daw Suu Kyi and her fledgling 
democracy, Myanmar will be pushed “into the arms of China” (Beech, 2017). The stronger 
Myanmar’s relationship with China and India becomes, the greater international support the 
Myanmar military has to continue its violence against the Rohingya community.  
United Nations 
The U.N. as an organizational body has utilized its available mechanisms to provide and 
support relief efforts to the Rohingya in Bangladesh, but it has been unable to address current 
and anticipated abuses in the Rakhine state, especially at the Security Council level. To intervene 
actively in another state, the U.N. requires sovereign state or Security Council approval, which 
has not been granted. Security Council members, especially China, remained quiet on the issue, 
only suggesting soft diplomacy to rectify the violence, until the United Kingdom and France 
released plans for a resolution in late October 2017 (Bays, 2017; Yap 2017). Russia and China 
initially blocked the resolution, but after the United Kingdom and France watered down their 
language of condemnation and reformatted the resolution into a Presidential Statement, the 
Security Council unanimously called on the Myanmar government to “end excessive military 
force and intercommunal violence” against the Rohingya in Rakhine on November 6, 2017 
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(Cameron-Moore, 2017b; U.N., 2017). Although the Presidential Statement specifically names 
responsible parties and affected victims, as well as offers solutions to the crisis, its text is not 
legally enforceable. Indeed, the U.N. representative from Myanmar rejected parts of the 
statement immediately (U.N. Security Council, 2017). 
 Although the Security Council has struggled to take effective action in this situation, 
U.N. agencies have been able to commit attention and resources to relief efforts, especially the 
UNHCR. The agency’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Volker Türk, has called on 
Myanmar to immediately implement the recommendations of the Rakhine Advisory Commission 
report that was launched and validated by Daw Suu Kyi (Tan, 2017c).  
Other high-profile members of the U.N. have expressed their grave concern over the 
crisis and have called on the Security Council to take effective action. After visiting Rakhine, 
Pramila Patten, the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in 
Conflict, believes that the Myanmar military has committed war crimes of rape and genocide 
against the Rohingya people. Patten voiced her concerns during the December 5, 2017 Human 
Rights Council meeting on Myanmar and during the December 12, 2017 Security Council 
meeting, as well as indicated that she would raise accusations against the Myanmar military with 
the International Criminal Court (Lone, 2017; UN News Centre, 2017b). The Assistant 
Secretary-General for Political Affairs Miroslav Jenča highlighted the lack of progress by the 
U.N. to take action during his speech to the Security Council on February 13, 2018 (S/PV/8179, 
2018). U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee 
appealed to the Human Rights Council on March 12, 2018 to pressure Myanmar to accept 
accountability for the genocide of the Rohingya people, as well as called for the establishment of 
CRISIS IN MYANMAR AND BANGLADESH: JORDAN RICHMOND 19 
 
 
 
a U.N. structure based in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh for three years to investigate, document, 
collect, consolidate, map” and analyze evidence of human rights violations (UNB, 2018).  
Despite these strong calls to act against Myanmar, agencies are restricted in their ability 
to assist governments without invitation, and these representatives can only request assistance, 
not provide it. Myanmar still has refused entry to a U.N. panel tasked with investigating the 
conditions in Rakhine, restricted NGO assistance to Rakhine, and denied U.N. Special 
Rapporteur Lee’s access to the Rakhine state (Lone, 2017; UNB, 2018). On March 19, 2018, 
reports surfaced that the Myanmar government is contemplating new legislation that would 
restrict the work of international NGOs like the U.N. within Rakhine, as well (Tribune Desk, 
2018). Additionally, neither Myanmar nor Bangladesh has approached UNHCR to discuss the 
process of repatriation efforts (Greene, 2017). As the U.N. lacks comprehensive measures to 
address potential forms of ethnic cleansing and genocide, its response mechanisms are limited to 
local agency action and press releases currently.  
ASEAN 
Although it is the leading organization for cooperation among Asian countries, ASEAN 
has observed a non-interference policy when it comes to intra-ASEAN relations for the most 
part. ASEAN has worked within the framework of a “One ASEAN, One Response” policy since 
2016, and without consolidated agreement between all member states, ministers have been 
hesitant to talk about this issue frankly (Westbrook, 2018). Indeed, the 30th ASEAN Summit, 
held in October 2017, neglected any mention of the Rohingya refugee and ethnic cleansing crisis 
in its official agenda, and the Sydney Declaration established during the Australia-ASEAN 
Summit in March 2018 made no specific mention of the crisis either (Lego, 2017; UNB, 2018).  
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Individual countries’ leaders, such as Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and 
Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, have expressed their desire to react to the crisis 
cooperatively, but these concerns fall flat in comparison to attention given to the ASEAN’s 
routine discussion of terrorism, the Korean peninsula, and the South China Sea (Lego, 2017). 
Further, other leaders, like Singapore’s Prime Minister Hsien Loong, have defended Myanmar’s 
right to self-governance in this case (UNB, 2018).  
Perhaps in part due to this lack of attention to the Rohingya ethnic cleansing crisis, 
Myanmar has entrusted the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on 
disaster management (AHA Centre) as one of the only outside authorities to facilitate 
humanitarian assistance in Rakhine (AHA Centre, 2017). The AHA Centre has contributed at 
least 80 tons of relief items to humanitarian assistance in Rakhine since October 2017, but 
ASEAN as a larger organization has remained on the sidelines of the crisis.  
The Legal Consequence of Intervention 
Kate Cronin-Furman, a Harvard University fellow studying mass atrocities, notes that 
states have privileges embedded in the international system, and that generating the will to 
impinge upon these privileges is difficult (Fisher, 2017). Denouncing the situation as genocide, 
rather than ethnic cleansing, invites legal consequences for the countries to intervene militarily, 
as well.   
In recognition of the little strategic benefit to intervening, foreign state governments 
wishing to advocate for the Rohingya are limited to diplomatic channels, economic sanctions 
against Myanmar, and financial contributions to relief organizations, then. The European Union 
and its Member States have only recommended the implementation of an arms embargo to 
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Myanmar and the suspension of invitations to the Commander-in-chief of the Myanmar armed 
forces and other senior military officers to cooperate on defense strategies (Council of the 
European Union, 2017). Upon his return from an official trip to Myanmar, Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson temporarily suspended travel for American officials to parts of the Rakhine state, and 
threatened sanctions against the Myanmar government, but no intervention efforts were 
described (Lederman and Lewis, 2017; Yap, 2017). The United Kingdom recently announced 
that it was cutting off £300,000 in aid to the Myanmar military, and pledging additional funding 
worth £12 million to Rohingya relief efforts (“Extra £12m in UK aid,” 2017; Yap, 2017). Japan 
has also pledged $23 million towards assisting the repatriation process and developing 
infrastructure in Rakhine, but this funding has been directly channeled to the Myanmar 
government (Associated Press, 2018).  
The likelihood of European, American, or other Asian state-sponsored intervention for 
the Rohingya is very slim. As Prashanth Parameswaran, a Southeast Asia security affairs 
specialist for The Diplomat, has highlighted, several European countries are looking to develop 
arms trade with Myanmar as soon as the existing European Union arms embargo is lifted (Yap, 
2017). Intervention against Myanmar’s wishes would likely jeopardize the realization of these 
arms deals. Overall, efforts to assist the Rohingya community are limited to local action in Cox’s 
Bazar and inefficient diplomacy at the U.N. and bilaterally with Myanmar. For those in the 
international community that are seeking resolutions to support the Rohingya, these political 
barriers to action should be taken into account first.  
Evaluating the 2017 Repatriation Agreement and Approaching Future Relief Efforts 
As part of the 2017 repatriation agreement, Myanmar intends to resettle 30,000 returning 
Rohingya at two reception centers and a temporary camp near its border with Bangladesh over a 
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two-year period (Siddiqui, 2018). Myanmar agreed to accept 300 Rohingya people each day, 
until three months have passed, at which point the country will accept a greater rate of Rohingya 
people each day. In time, returnees would be allowed to return to their “place of origin” or 
“nearest to their place of origin,” but no specified date has been announced (Lee, 2018). Though 
the resettlement operations were planned to start on January 22, 2018, Bangladesh has delayed 
plans because the process of compiling and verifying a list of people to send back to Myanmar is 
incomplete.  
Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister A.H. Mahmood Ali noted that arrangements in these 
villages would be temporary, but temporary shelters for returning refugees established through 
the last Bangladesh-Myanmar repatriation agreement in 2012 still host those Rohingya (Lee 
2017; “Rohingya to stay in temporary shelters,” 2017). The 2017 repatriation agreement also 
stipulates that “Myanmar will take all possible measures to see that…[returnees’] freedom of 
movement in Rakhine State will be allowed in conformity with the existing laws and 
regulations” (“Rohingya to stay in temporary shelters,” 2017). However, because the Rohingya 
are not recognized as one of Myanmar’s official ethnic groups, current laws and regulations do 
not grant Rohingya the right to move freely (Ministry of Information, 2008). A spokesman for 
the Myanmar government, Zaw Htay, noted that returning Rohingya could apply for citizenship 
“after they pass the verification process,” but this neglects the rights of the Rohingya stranded in 
Bangladeshi mega camps (Dhaka Tribune, 2018). Without clear expectations that the repatriation 
agreement will grant returning and remaining refugees a claim to property and a new right to 
freedom of movement, Rohingya are not guaranteed permanent shelter at their place of 
residence, nor the ability to travel beyond the camps and recruitment centers.  
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The repatriation agreement fails to address the history and geographical dispersion of 
Rohingya refugees, as well. While the agreement accounts for the total of 750,000 refugees who 
have fled since October 2016, it does not address the estimated 200,000 Rohingya who arrived in 
Bangladesh during past surges of communal violence and military operations (AFP, 2018). 
Additionally, an estimated 6,500 Rohingya have taken refuge in a so-called no man’s land along 
the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, and Bangladesh’s Refugee Relief and Repatriation 
Commissioner Mohammad Abul Kalam Azad indicated that Bangladeshi authorities are not 
including them as part of the official repatriation process (AFP, 2018). Repatriating 30,000 
refugees, though a significant task, does not address the nearly 926,500 Rohingya refugees that 
would still remain in Bangladesh. Additionally, because the repatriation process is voluntary, and 
many Rohingya are fearful of returning to Myanmar, the 2017 repatriation agreement may not 
recruit full participation (AFP, 2018).  
These repatriation efforts, while politically expedient, are only temporary solutions that 
do not address what the Rohingya people need and desire based on their history of abuse. Over 
time, it is necessary for long-term solutions to address sociocultural basis for the crisis 
comprehensively by opening Rakhine to outside aid group relief and monitoring, rehabilitating 
the racial and religious tension between Rohingya and Buddhist communities in Rakhine, and 
incorporating and fully enfranchising the Rohingya people in Myanmar through substantial 
independent or intergovernmental monitoring. Given the political limitations of Myanmar and 
Bangladesh, NGOs, other state governments, and the U.N. to address this 2016-2018 Rohingya-
refugee and ethnic cleansing crisis as discussed previously, these long-term solutions are 
important to meeting the needs of the Rohingya people but are almost impossible to ensure 
currently. Rather, immediate concerns related to humanitarian relief must be prioritized first. 
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With attention to the current socioeconomic conditions of Rohingya refugees and 
Rohingya still living in Rakhine, resolutions should address the disproportionate population of 
fatherless families and orphaned children in Rohingya communities as a result of the crisis. 
Children and women constitute more than half of the total camp populations, and, according to a 
survey by Bangladesh’s Department of Social Services, a total of 36,673 orphaned Rohingya 
children live in Cox’s Bazar (UN News Centre, 2017a). Rohingya refugees are also facing 
incredible psychological repercussions from the violence endured outside and inside the camps. 
Of those living in Cox’s Bazar, IOM case workers have identified 14,361 extremely vulnerable 
individuals in need of substantial psychological first aid (IOM, 2018). The approaching cyclone 
and monsoon seasons in Southeast Asia threaten efforts on all fronts, as the camps and their 
personnel are only equipped to carry out temporary relief. Edouard Beigbeder, head of UNICEF 
programs in Bangladesh, acknowledged the potential for standing water pools to attract malaria-
carrying mosquitoes to the camps, as well as the potential of severe flooding in the camps’ tents 
(UN News Centre, 2018)  
UNHCR spokesperson William Spindler has noted that there is an urgent need for 
infrastructure to provide “life-saving services and aid” like water access points, latrines, bathing 
areas, distribution points, and safe spaces for women and girls (UNHCR, 2017). As international 
financial assistance continues to pour into relief agencies, NGOs should prioritize efforts to build 
infrastructure with the Bangladeshi government. The 2017 repatriation agreement may 
encourage Rohingya refugees to return to Myanmar in the next two years, but as past repatriation 
attempts have proven in the past, many Rohingya fear leaving refugee camps out of concern for 
their health and safety. Thus, creating infrastructure, such as easily accessible roads and access to 
water points, will serve the Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar best during their extended stay.  
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In terms of providing food, immediate medical treatment, and temporary shelter, current 
relief efforts have been successful. These efforts have engaged a variety of international NGOs, 
U.N. agencies, the Bangladeshi government, and local Bangladeshi NGOs, with the financial 
support of individual governments. For example, in the OO zone of the Kutupalong-Balukhali 
Extension, Action Against Hunger provides food, while local NGO Gonoshasthaya Kendra 
performs medical screenings, UNHCR distributes shelter kits, and Save the Children assists 
refugees in building their shelters (Tan, 2017a). This approach to relief efforts, wherein 
organizations provide a particular need to the affected population, is comprehensive, and can 
prove beneficial to current residents of Rakhine if Myanmar granted humanitarian access. 
Additionally, as there is no official Rohingya lobby, advocates should pursue solutions that 
elevate local and regional actors into “gatekeepers” whose approval is crucial for coordinating 
international action, according to research by political scientists Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. 
Williams (Fisher, 2017). Channeling funds into organizations that are already involved in relief 
efforts, like Action Against Hunger or Gonoshasthaya Kendra, can make a true impact on the 
daily lives of Rohingya refugees.  
Finally, real-time research efforts that utilize first-hand accounts from Rohingya refugees 
like the final report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, the United Nations’ January-
December 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, and IOM external updates must be supported 
through their process to evaluate the changing dynamics of the crisis on the ground to develop 
new relief priorities. 
In terms of addressing long-term strategies to resolution, Myanmar’s alliance with China 
and India must be broken first. U.N. Special Rapporteur Lee is making official visits to India and 
China as part of her preparation to report to the General Assembly later this year, and other 
CRISIS IN MYANMAR AND BANGLADESH: JORDAN RICHMOND 26 
 
 
 
efforts diffuse this relationship would be worthwhile (UNB, 2018). Further, while ASEAN as a 
political unit is precluded from direct intervention in Myanmar, its organizational structure as a 
dialogue between member states behind closed doors offers an opportunity to work with Daw 
Suu Kyi on relief efforts privately. The procurement of relief items to Rakhine through the AHA 
Centre is indicative of the potential for ASEAN to become a forum through which the crisis is 
addressed practically. One long-term solution could be to pressure ASEAN foreign ministers’ 
attention to the crisis, like protesters in Sydney, Australia did outside of the March Australia-
ASEAN summit (Dziedzic & McDonald, 2018). As the profile of the crisis increased between 
this summit and the last summit, more ASEAN ministers have pushed the issue directly with 
Daw Suu Kyi.  
Ultimately, without a proper response, the situation for Rohingya in Myanmar and 
Bangladesh could worsen, and the international community could witness casualty rates into the 
tens of thousands as a result of famine, dehydration, disease, and structural violence. Proposed 
action to resolve this crisis should acknowledge how periods of political turnover in Arakan from 
1784 to 1826, historical tensions between Rohingya Muslims and Buddhists in Rakhine, and the 
functional defense of the Buddhist-Burmese identity by the military junta government have 
contributed to physical and social displacement of the Rohingya people from Myanmar, 
prioritizing these sources of conflict for specific rehabilitation. Further, proposed action should 
address the developing political contexts underlying Myanmar, Bangladesh, regional powers like 
China and India, the United Nations, and ASEAN before committing to blanket solutions like 
economic sanctions or embassy closures. Immediate relief efforts, such as preparing for the 
monsoon season, improving psychological treatment efforts, pressuring sympathetic actions of 
the international community to commit funding to local efforts, developing sustainable 
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infrastructure in Cox’s Bazar, supporting on-the-ground reporting and research efforts, and 
expanding multi-level specialized relief efforts should be the top priorities moving forward.  
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